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V. THE FEDERAL RULES FIFTY YEARS
LATER
DISCOVERY VICES AND TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE VIRTUES
IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD, JR.I

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whatever criticisms we
might have of their details, have been a major triumph of law reform.
They have served for fifty years substantially intact, a statement that
can be made of few other pieces of major legislation in our era. They
have been adopted in a majority of the states' and have been a principal source of borrowing in states with strong traditions of autonomy in
matters of procedural law, notably California, Illinois, and New York.2
Moreover, within almost every state, a procedure based on the Federal
Rules governs most types of civil litigation. Taking account of their use
in state courts, Federal Rules provisions thus apply to virtually every
type of contested civil case involving interests of substantial financial or
social significance.' Indeed, the comprehensive scope of the Federal
Rules is now the basis of complaints against them.
I wish to address two basic criticisms of the Federal Rules. One
criticism emanates primarily from the corporate and business sector and
concerns the broad scope of discovery under the Federal Rules. The
criticism is that Federal Rules discovery permits excessive intrusion
Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.

See Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WAsH. L. REv. 1367, 1377-78 (1986). Of course,
many states have modified various specific provisions in the course of adopting the
Federal Rules. See id. On the whole, however, a state that "adopts" the Federal Rules
does so by taking them substantially intact.

2 The area of procedure most strongly influenced by the Federal Rules has been
discovery. While New York still retains some discovery restrictions deriving from its
autonomous procedural tradition, the New York discovery rules of today are much
more like the Federal Rules as promulgated in 1938 than the New York discovery
rules as they stood in that year.
' This generalization excludes the procedures governing such matters as small
claims, domestic relations, and bankruptcy.
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into confidential deliberations in the management of organizations. The
other criticism comes from legal academia and concerns the "trans-substantive" scope of the Federal Rules. Both criticisms are objections to
what might be called "procedural imperialism" in the Federal Rules.
The objection to discovery is that the Rules authorize parties to reach
too deep. The trans-substantive objection is that the Rules reach too
far.
I shall suggest that the objection to the depth of discovery may
have more weight than it has been accorded in most discourse on the
Federal Rules and that the trans-substantive objection has much less
weight than it has been accorded. I also shall suggest that if the Rules
are tailored along lines suggested by the objection to their broad transsubstantive scope, the revisions are likely to result in limiting the depth
of discovery into confidential organizational matters. If so, a drive to
tailor the Federal Rules to specific subtypes of litigation may result in
some peculiar political alliances. I think there is little risk of this.
Neither scholars nor responsible partisans in political arenas have come
forward with concrete proposals for amendment of the Rules except in
matters of detail. If that is not evidence of success in law reform, there
is no such thing.
I.

THE DISCLOSURE ETHOS OF THE FEDERAL RULES

In large perspective, the Federal Rules made three basic changes.
The first was simplified pleading. Pleaders are allowed to assert legal
grievances, and legal defenses as well, in general terms." The second
basic change was redesign of the rules governing joinder of parties and
claims. Under the Federal Rules, joinder of parties and claims is based
on the contours of the out-of-court transaction, not the legal categories
in which the parties' conduct can be conceptualized. 5 The third change
was, of course, in discovery.
Under discovery law as it previously stood, the discovering party
generally had to specify matters as to which discovery was sought. The
disclosing party was required to answer only "relevant" questions and
to produce specifically identified documents.6 The discovery law in the
See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 14 & 18-24; see also Hazard, Forms of Action Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 629-32 (1988)
(comparing transaction-based joinder under the Federal Rules and legal-category joinder under the Field Code); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982-91
(1987) (emphasizing the foundation of the Federal Rules on equitable principles to ease
the complextiy of litigation rather than on technical legal concepts).
I See generally G. RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) (describing dis'
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Federal Rules in effect requires the responding party to come forth
with whatever information she would have to concede was relevant to
the subject matter of the action, so long as the request was made by the
discovering party.
In form, discovery under the Federal Rules still requires specifically formulated requests by the discovering party. Taking a deposition
generally requires that the discovering party name the person to be interrogated,' not that the disclosing party identify the witnesses who
have information. Obtaining admissions through interrogatories or requests for admission requires that the matters to be conceded must be
stated with particularity,' not that the disclosing party promptly offer a
stipulation of matters not in issue. Obtaining documents requires that
the discovering party "designate" categories of documents to be provided,9 not that the disclosing party produce whatever documents are
relevant. I0
Except for documents discovery, however, in operation the system
is one of mandatory response rather than focused inquest. The disclosing party is required to identify witnesses who might be worth deposing, 1 and parties are subject to subtle coercions to stipulate undisputed
facts. 2 The controversy over the discovery rules therefore centers on
documents production.
This is not to say that excesses in deposition and interrogatories
practice are not also deeply troublesome. It is simply to say that the
broad access to document repositories is the most powerful weapon in
the Rules discovery armory, particularly in cases involving conduct by
business or government. This is because documents discovery is not
only a vital disclosure mechanism in itself, but because it feeds the deposition process by providing clues as to whom to question and what
questions to ask. Moreover, although it may be impolite to say, in oral
deposition the past can be reshaped in the deponent's recollection,
whereas the content of a document is immutable. Without documents
discovery, depositions would be far less effective and interrogatories
covery procedures and devices governing various American jurisdictions in 1932).
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (when disclosing
party is an organization, it must designate agents to respond on its behalf).
8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a), 36(a).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
10 Cf. Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1986)
(work-product doctrine protects certain relevant documents from being discoverable).
Il See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 30(b). Both rules together operate to this effect,
permitting interrogatories to seek the identity of individuals with knowledge of discoverable matters.
12 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (admissions should be used for "obtaining admissions
... which will avoid unnecessary proof"); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (cost sanctions).
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would have much less purpose. It is therefore the device provoking the
most intense resistance and game-playing.
Discovery of documents in cases involving the conduct of business
or government often proceeds by a vicious game in which the respondent has every incentive to trim and cheat. 3 Highly developed dialectical skills have evolved. One skill is that of construing a documents demand so that it does not reach the very smoking gun document that the
responding lawyer holds in her hand. Another skill is that of instructing the paralegals, without actually saying so, to bury the important documents in a pile of paper chaff or to fail to find the important
documents in the first place. Still another skill is dividing search responsibility with the client so that the latter takes care of documents
that can be made to disappear. The prevalence of such underside discovery practice cannot be measured, for evident reasons. It is believed to
be pervasive enough, however, to sustain widespread suspicion and cynicism among the trial bar. This effect is itself sufficient cause to question the present discovery rules.
Being deeply troubled by the present discovery rules, particularly
documents production, is one thing. Coming up with coherent alternatives is something else. Everyone seems frustrated by this challenge. In
a moment of my own frustration, I suggested not long ago that the
documents discovery procedure be reversed in cases in which production was voluminous or threatened with motion practice. The discovering party would no longer play the game of Twenty Questions, and the
responding party would no longer play Hide-and-Seek. Instead, a neutral documents archivist would be appointed to survey the responding
party's whole information system and identify all sets of materials that
appear "relevant to the subject matter" of the action, in the phrase in
Rule 26(b). These files then would be examined by a lawyer for the
discovering party whose participation would be limited to the discovery
process and governed by suitable confidentiality rules. 4 Claims of privilege and irrelevance could be identified and fought within this framework. 5 The procedure could be made to work because something like
this was used in the massive anti-trust case, United States v. American
13 See Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A JudicialPerspective, 67 CALIF. L.
264, 278 (1979) (referring to an "irresistible temptation to cheat" in discovery).
14

REV.

Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3 (1983) ("A lawyer

may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other
than the client . . ").
15 Cf United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 603-53
(D.D.C. 1979) (adopting guidelines for asserting privilege protecton in the context of
complex documents discovery).
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Telephone & Telegraph Co. 6
There has been no second to this suggestion that corporate and
governmental documents simply be turned over for inspection to a
parajudicial officer. Although such a procedure would cut through a lot
of the nonsense in present documents discovery in big cases, it could be
intrusive in a way that could concern civil libertarians.
The powerful effects of the Federal Rules on discovery are augmented by their synergism with the pleading and joinder provisions.
Pleading in general terms permits a claimant to prosecute another
party without having to explain exactly why the party is being
charged.17 The joinder of parties rules permit a civil prosecutor to proceed in quite the same way a criminal prosecutor goes after conspirators, giving all participants inducement to point fingers at each other.
Correlatively, discovery facilitates adding parties whose participation in
the transaction was not known at first. The open disclosure ethos of the
Federal Rules makes them a boon to persons with legal grievances, that
is, plaintiffs.
As far as I can see, in no respect have the Federal Rules put civil
plaintiffs in a worse position than they were under the code pleading
system. Perhaps the only exception to this generalization is the enlarged
potential scope of summary judgment and the mandatory physical examination in personal injury cases. Even these devices are not major
impediments or detriments compared to the situation of plaintiffs fifty
years ago.
Summary judgment has had a tortuous career in the Federal
Rules. The original intent was that summary judgment have a substantial role. Court interpretations, however, rendered the device virtually
dormant, except in commercial cases, until its recent revitalization by
the Supreme Court."8 Even with summary judgment revitalized, plaintiffs are generally no worse off than they were under code pleading.
Under revitalized summary judgment, a plaintiff loses upon failure
through discovery to produce evidence to substantiate her suspicions.
Under the codes, a plaintiff could not even get into discovery unless she
could independently substantiate such suspicions, for substantiation had
to be manifested in a complaint that stated "facts."
As far as mandatory physical examination is concerned, that procedure at worst has been neutral to plaintiffs. It prevents sham damN

86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1979). See generally W.

BRAZIL,

G.

HAZARD

& P.

RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983) (analyzing the role special masters can play in discovery).

17

18

This is the effect of the rule in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986).
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ages claims in personal injury cases, but it also provides a mechanism
of persuasion in settling cases involving serious injuries.
Remembering as I do how a defense could be conducted under old
code pleading, I see little in the Federal Rules that on balance helps
defendants. The codes required the plaintiff to plead with particularity;
the Rules let her get away with generalities. The codes required a
plaintiff to elect between tort and contract; the Rules allow her to proceed on both. The codes limited depositions to parties, except upon a
showing of special need, and a discovery fishing expedition could be
launched only by a party who could tag the fish before catching it.
This expansive effect in favor of grievants has been felt across the
board. Liberalization in pleading had its earliest conspicuous effect in
FELA claims 9 and then in antitrust claims.20 Liberalization of joinder
had great, if uncelebrated, effects in civil rights cases, in which articulation of rights and remedies was unconstrained by old doctrines that separated law and equity, direct injury from indirect, and barely indulged
the class action. 2 ' Modern products liability, toxic tort, and environmental litigation would be simply inconceivable without the combination of liberal pleading, liberal joinder, and liberal discovery. The total
effect of this development has redounded to the benefit of "have nots"
relative to "haves."
Grievances about federal discovery, particularly documents discovery, usually are couched in terms of cost, inefficiency, and redundancy
of effort. Yet these concerns, although perhaps legitimate, are not the
fundamental source of discontent. A party receiving a massive documents demand can avoid the costs of complying by the simple expedient
of opening the relevant files and making a photocopy machine available
to the inquiring party.2 2 Putting the point this way, however, reveals
the underlying grievance.
If the grievance were frankly presented, it is that production of the
documents violates a principle of privacy which corporate and governmental officials consider ought to protect them. Corporate and government documents that are worth discovering express the thoughts of people with burdensome responsibilities making confidential decisions
about tough and often insoluble problems. Documents that speak with
19 See Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1949).
20 See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976).
21 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.

REV. 1281, 1289 (1976); cf. Coffin, The Frontierof Remedies: A Callfor Exploration,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 988-91 (1979) (arguing that even more liberal procedural rules

are needed for civil rights litigation).
22 Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c) (permitting a party to respond to an interrogatory by
producing the business records that contain the requested information).
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a candor unguarded by anticipation of litigation are particularly damaging. These communications subsequently are laid bare to the harsh
light of second-guessing litigation. Counterpart communications between spouses within a domestic establishment are generally privileged.2" So are those at high levels of government. 4 Yet corporate officials and lower echelon public servants enjoy no such protection.
The risk of exposure generates anxiety, anger, and resentment on
the part of officials responsible for products that result in injury, toxics
that result in torts, and environments that the public will want rehabilitated at someone's expense. These feelings are coming to be shared by
municipal officials responsible for resolving conflicts over race relations,
schools, police practices, and other social issues. The anxiety and anger
reflect profound underlying differences over social choices, particularly
choices for which someone must really pay. The resentment is intensified by the fact that contemporary litigation often is based on substantive norms that have become operative long after occurrence of the conduct being challenged. This is true, for example, of the legal norms
applied in some of the asbestos cases and in most of the toxic dump site
cases. Yet the differences in public policy regarding these issues often
are left unresolved by coherent legislation and sometimes cannot even
be publicly discussed in rational terms. The issues are too ugly, complex, and divisive.
According to my observation, resentment runs very deep in managerial circles over this interaction between open discovery and rapid
evolution of substantive law. It is bad enough to be charged on the basis
of changing substantive rules. It is more deeply galling to have the
charges substantiated by documents dredged from files emanating from
a prior time of innocence. Police departments have learned to keep their
records clean of potentially embarrassing detail. Corporate and municipal personnel are following. Special language forms are evolving when
written communication is unavoidable.
These are social costs of the open disclosure which Federal Rules
discovery permits. Of course, the Federal Rules are not alone in sponsoring the principle of open access to information. The same principle
is reflected in such legislative measures as the Federal Freedom of Information Act, state "sunshine" laws, and myriad federal and state
laws requiring maintenance of records of public and private transactions.25 Liberal discovery is a product of the citizen-consumer orientaSee MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 78, at 188-89 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
See id. § 106, at 261-62.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Federal Freedom of Information Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing access to govern22
24
25
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tion of public policy in the last fifty years, not the misguided predilections of the committee that drafted the Federal Rules. If the Federal
Rules originally did not provide for broad discovery, they would have
been amended to that effect. But that does not mitigate the fact that
social costs are involved, even if they are concealed in euphemisms concerning the expense of litigation. I doubt that the document discovery
rules will be much changed. It is likely, however, that discovery in the
future will turn up fewer documents worth discovering. 26
II.

THE "TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE"

SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL RULES

The second principal criticism of the Federal Rules is that they
indiscriminately govern all kinds and types of litigation, whereas civil
procedure rules properly constructed would be shaped to the needs of
specific categories of litigation. This critique contemplates separate sets
of rules for civil rights cases, antitrust cases, routine automobile cases,
and so on. The criticism has been expressed perhaps most incisively by
Professor Robert Cover, esteemed colleague prematurely gone from
us.2" Yet despite the great respectability of its source, the "trans-substantive" critique seems misguided to me. It overstates the reach of the
Federal Rules and underestimates the technical and political difficulties
of trying to tailor procedures to specific types of controversies.
In the first place, the Federal Rules as such are not a comprehensive code of civil procedure. For example, they do not provide the right
to a jury trial, the feature of American civil procedure that most
sharply distinguishes it from civil procedure everywhere else in the
world. The right to a jury trial is prescribed in the Constitution for the
federal courts and by counterpart provisions of state constitutions for
the state courts.28 The precise scope of the right to a jury trial is determined partly by decisions of the Supreme Court and partly by legislative specifications.2" The Federal Rules simply incorporate those dispoment records maintained on individuals); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(Federal "Sunshine in Government" Act); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney
1988) (providing access to government records maintained on individuals); N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW §§ 100-11 (McKinney 1988) (New York Open Meetings Law).
28 An example is the fact, as I am advised, that certified public accountant firms
formerly kept a "paper trail" of all their auditing tests and queries, but no longer do
so. These files became the auditors' worst enemies in litigation.
27 See Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 731 (1975).
28 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
28 See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Rev. Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977) (seventh amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning adjudication tasks to an administrative agency); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) (right to jury trial in declaratory judgment if as-
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sitions by reference. 30
The Federal Rules also do not undertake to define the rules of
federal jurisdiction. Performing that task through rules of court is precluded by the Rules Enabling Act. x Federal jurisdiction remains a
"hodge-podge" even though a strong case has been made for substantial
rationalization of the respective roles of the federal and state courts,
particularly regarding diversity and removal of federal question matters.3 2 Such a transformation remains both enticing and elusive. As
events have evolved, however, the Supreme Court's interpretations of
the Federal Rules have severely constricted the potential for a coherent
structure in diversity jurisdiction. 3
The Federal Rules also do not address such matters as res judicata, 4 bar of claims by lapse of time, 5 choice of law,3" or, except for
technical details, the reach of service of process.3 " Nor do the Federal
Rules address the problem of federal common law; the Supreme Court,
without the benefit of legislation, took care of that problem the same
year it adopted the Rules.' Furthermore, in the important matter of
evidentiary privileges, Congress concluded that the law should be made

by judicial decision and not the rule-making process.3 9
Hence, although the Federal Rules are trans-substantive, they are
sured in regular suit); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958)
(federal policy favoring jury determinations); Note, CongressionalProvisionfor Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 401-02 (1973) (stating
the roles of the Supreme Court and Congress in determining the right to a jury trial).
30 See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1132-37 (1982).
11 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1-5 (1969).
" See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978)
(no ancillary jurisdiction over joined claim despite a "common nucleus of operative
fact" with federal diversity claim); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (joinder
of municipality on a state law claim not within a court's ancillary jurisdiction); Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount for diversity suits); Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) (refusing to allow aggregation of the amounts involved in
separate and distinct claims under Rule 23 to meet jurisdictional amount requirement).
"' See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380
(1985); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1979); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982).
" See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980); cf.United States
v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (using federal statute of limitation to bar claim).
See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975).
See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S.Ct. 404, 409-10 (1987).
38 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
s See FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
397-99 (1981) (analysis of the scope of the attorney-client privilege based on a balancing of policies).
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not trans-procedural. Recognition of this fact puts the rules-drafting
process in a better perspective. If account is taken of what the Federal
Rules do not cover in the way of adjective law, the jurisdiction of the
Rules Committee barely intrudes upon, let alone threatens, legislative
sovereignty. 40
Nevertheless, the Federal Rules have been of great-may we say
substantial-significance as far as they go. Indeed, the Federal Rules
have come to be defended on the ground that they afford better access
to courts and thereby facilitate greater social justice. This premise is
explicit in several of the papers at this conference. Reference is made of
the uses of civil litigation to remedy racial discrimination, gender discrimination, environmental pollution, and other injustices. That the
Rules do facilitate such social justice litigation seems little in doubt, as
suggested earlier. Further, the remediation of these injustices, at least
up to a point, is essential even for one whose political premises are
conservative, as I consider mine to be. The examples of Northern Ireland, Lebanon, South Africa, India, and now Israel remind us of the
social costs of being indifferent to effective microcosmic remedies for
macrocosmic social injustice.
The Federal Rules have been an effective instrument of social justice because they reduce the barriers to the formulation and proof of
claims against the existing systems of authority. Formulation of new
theories of legal rights is simpler, virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms of old legal categories, as
was code pleading and common law pleading.41 Proof of new theories
of liability likewise is simpler with the aid of comprehensive discovery.
This relationship between civil justice and social justice was not
anticipated in 1938. The social wrongs whose remediation is assisted by
the Federal Rules in the present era had not then appeared on the civil
litigation agenda. The emergence of civil rights and environmental litigation hardly could have been anticipated. If an attempt had been made
in 1938 to tailor the new Federal Rules to specific salient types of litigation, the focus probably would have been on personal injury litigation, particularly FELA and Jones Act cases, and stockholder derivative litigation. Of what use would rules for those cases have been in
civil rights, gender, or environmental injury litigation? More fundamentally, if the rules-drafting process had focussed on tailoring rules to
those types of litigation, there was no reason to think that the social
justice interests would have prevailed. In personal injury litigation, the
40

Cf Burbank, supra note 31, at 1188, 1191-92 (noting how the scope of the

Federal Rules does not interfere with congressional authority).
41 See Hazard, supra note 5, at 629-30; Subrin, supra note 5, at 973-74.
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main change effected by the Federal Rules was to require a plaintiff to
42
submit to a pre-trial physical, a rule that probably favors defendants.
In stockholders derivative litigation, the model reform of the time was
to require plaintiffs to post a bond for costs, a provision whose very aim
was to deter derivative litigation.43 How far would the NAACP have
gotten if it had tried to tailor Rule 23 to its purposes in 1938, or in
1956 for that matter?
The dynamic of social justice litigation has been the use of existing
general forms of procedure for new substantive purposes. Putting new
wine in old bottles is especially congenial to institutional conservatives,
who may support substantive change within the framework of existing
procedural norms, but who are allergic to comprehensive legal transformations. If it is true that substantive legal change often is accomplished
by incremental modification of procedure, it is also true that such
change is politically most feasible when the change in procedure is only
incremental. In this light, the "trans-substantive" critique of the Federal Rules is politically bizarre if, as is evidently the case, it is voiced
from a concern that civil litigation continues to be an important instrument of social reform. The Federal Rules have been employed in "social justice" litigation precisely because they are cast in general terms,
rather than tailored to specific types of litigation.
Thus, we are carried to contemplate fundamental constitutional
considerations in connection with our civil procedure: maintaining a
balance between institutional stability, whereby to accomplish change
without tearing apart the institutions through which change is effected,
and substantive dynamism, whereby preservation of institutions does
not become a political straightjacket. There is no prescription for the
right balance at any given time, but we should not ignore or disparage
the virtues of a trans-substantive concept of procedure. After all, the
due process principle stated in the fifth and fourteenth amendments is
quintessentially such a concept. Trans-substantivity of procedure is a
principle to which commitment is shared by persons of such different
substantive orientations as, for example, Judge Posner and Judge
Carter. The historical record of the Federal Rules evidences the generative power of this principle.

42 See supra text preceding note 19. Four justices of the Supreme Court thought
the provision for physical examination was so "substantive" as to be beyond the scope
of the Enabling Act. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 16 (1941) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting, joined by Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ.).
41 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548-50 (1949).

